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The angel-halo effect: How increases in corporate social responsibility and irresponsibility
relate to firm performance

Abstract
Purpose – To examine how increases in corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate
social irresponsibility (CSiR) relate to firm performance. Further, we investigate how increases
in CSR (CSiR) while CSiR (CSR) is present relate to three measures of firm performance:
profitability, management efficiency, and market valuation.
Design/methodology/approach - Using over 10,000 observations from 2009-2013 and
combined data from Sustainalytics and Compustat we examine how increases in either CSR or
CSiR relate to firm performance.
Findings - We find that increased CSR significantly relates to increased firm performance in all
three measures, and that increased CSiR significantly relates to decreased profitability only.
Furthermore, increased CSR when CSiR is present relates to increased efficiency and market
valuation. Lastly, increased CSiR when CSR is present relates to increased profitability and
efficiency. Our results suggest CSR dominates the relationship to firm performance, as it is
positively related to all three measures of firm performance, and when CSR and CSiR exist
simultaneously, CSR has a dominant positive effect.
Research limitations/implications – Our sample consists of U.S. firms only from 2009-2013,
the generalizability of our results to other countries and time periods is unknown.
Practical implications – Our results demonstrating differing effects based on the measure of
firm performance suggest that managers should be specific with which measures are used to
gauge the impact of CSR and CSiR. In addition, managers would be wise to invest in CSR as our
results suggest that they can improve profitability, efficiency and market value. Even further, the
empirically identified angel-halo effect suggests that investments in CSR may counter any
potential negative effects from CSiR. Lastly, the latter results suggest that firms can “get away”
with some degree of CSiR when CSR is present.
Originality/value - By examining changing levels of CSR and CSiR independently and
conjunctly across various measures of firm performance, we found a dominating role for CSR,
which we label the angel-halo effect.
Keywords - Corporate social responsibility, Corporate social irresponsibility, Financial and firm
performance, Angel-halo effect, Devil-horn effect.
Paper type - Empirical

Introduction
We live in a world of increasing paradox; consider the following examples. Wealth in the
stock market has reached an all time high, yet the number of homeless people, and most
alarmingly children, living in homeless shelters is also at an all time high. Where there is an
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obesity epidemic in developed countries and millions of starving people in developing countries.
Where we have more knowledge and technology than ever before matched with increasing social
inequality and uncertainty. We have a growing need for government involvement to regulate
financial markets and greenhouse gas emissions, yet increasing animosity towards governments
across the world with large-scale growth in militias, protests, and civil disobedience. Where
more than 50 million displaced people across the world (the most since World War II) are fleeing
persecution in their countries, yet neighboring countries are hardening laws to make it harder for
people to enter their countries.
These larger, societal paradoxes also manifest within corporations. In this paper we
investigate the paradox of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate social
irresponsibility (CSiR), where corporations exhibit both types of behavior simultaneously.
Corporate social responsibility is defined as voluntary corporate actions that firms engage in to
positively respond to stakeholder interests and improve social conditions (Carroll, 1979;
Mackey, Mackey, and Barney, 2007; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Silberhorn and Warren,
2007; Wood, 1991). While many researchers focus on the phenomenon of CSR, an important
related aspect concerns CSiR, which is a conceptually distinct construct (Godfrey et al., 2009;
Kotchen and Moon, 2012; Muller and Kräussl, 2011; Tench, Sun and Jones, 2012). Corporate
social irresponsibility is defined as ‘the set of corporate actions that negatively affects an
identifiable social stakeholder’s legitimate claims (in the long run)’ (Strike, Gao and Bansal,
2006: 852).
While researchers have long studied CSR (Bragdon and Marlin, 1972; Hart, 1995; Porter
and Van der Linde, 1995; Russo and Fouts, 1997), CSiR is a less explored area (Muller and
Kräussl, 2011; Lioui and Sharma, 2012; Oikonomou, Brooks and Pavelin, 2012; Tench et al.,
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2012), and the balance between the two distinct constructs and the relationship to firm
performance is even less understood. Taken together, numerous studies have found positive
relationships between CSR activities and firm performance (Brammer and Millington, 2008;
Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Wang, Choi and Li, 2008), and a number of
studies have found negative relationships between CSiR activities and firm performance (Baron,
Harjoto and Hoje, 2011; Lioui and Sharma, 2012; Muller and Kräussl, 2011; Oikonomou, et al.,
2012). Few studies have investigated the simultaneous occurrence of both CSR and CSiR
(exceptions include Strike et al., 2006; Tang et al., 2015), and we are unaware of any studies that
have examined how increases in CSR (CSiR) when CSiR (CSR) is present relate to firm
performance.
In this paper, we combine two datasets, one that provides information on CSR and CSiR,
Sustainalytics, and one that provides financial data, Compustat. In the end, we use over 10,000
U.S. firm-quarter observations from 2009-2013 to examine how increases in CSR and CSiR
relate to various measures of firm performance, and how they interact in their relationship to firm
performance.
The research question addressed is how do increases in CSR (CSiR) while CSiR (CSR) is
present relate to various measures of firm performance. In addressing this research question, we
make the following contributions to the literature. First, we examine how increasing levels of
CSR and CSiR relate to various measures of firm performance both independently and when
they occur simultaneously.
Second, we empirically demonstrate that CSR and CSiR are separate, non-symmetrical
concepts based on their differing effects on firm performance. More importantly, we introduce a
new theoretical concept labeled the angel-halo and/or devil-horn effect; where angel-halo refers

4
to CSR being rewarded even when CSiR increases. Thus previous CSR creates an angel-halo
where a corporation continues to be rewarded even when exhibiting CSiR. In contrast, the devilhorn effect refers to CSiR being punished even when CSR increases. Thus previous CSiR creates
devil-horns where a corporation continues to be punished even when exhibiting CSR. Thus we
extend the literature from the conventional question: Does it pay to be good? To more innovative
angles: Does it pay to be good even when also being bad? Or, do you pay for being bad even
when also being good? Our results clearly demonstrate the existence of an angel-halo effect
where firms tend to benefit from their CSR even when CSiR is present, and even further, when
CSiR is present and increasing.
Third, we use three alternative measures of firm performance that are broken into
accounting-based measures (ROA and turnover ratio) and a market-based measure (Tobin’s Q).
Thus we explain how corporate behaviors can have, or not have, differing effects and
implications on firm performance. This demonstrates that the relationship between CSR, CSiR
and firm performance may be more complicated than previous studies suggest, especially when
CSR and CSiR and both present and changing within an organization.
This paper proceeds as follows: First, we review the literature examining the relationship
between CSR, CSiR and firm performance. Second, we develop hypotheses and empirical
predictions. Third, we delineate our data, variables and methodology. Fourth, we describe and
discuss our results. Lastly, before concluding we discuss our implications for academics and
practitioners and the limitations to this study.

Corporate social responsibility and irresponsibility, and firm performance
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Although researchers have been examining the relationship between CSR and firm
performance for decades (summed up nicely by Margolis and Walsh, 2003; and, Orlitzky,
Schmidt and Rynes, 2003), the direction of the relationship remains unclear. Correspondingly,
there have been calls for a deconstruction of CSR and its relationship to firm performance as it
has become clear that a one-size-fits-all theoretical approach aiming to explain the relationship is
not feasible nor advisable (Barnet, 2007). More specific to this paper, researchers have also
called for a deconstruction of CSR and CSiR, where they are not viewed as a zero-sum game but
as separate constructs that can occur simultaneously (Strike et al., 2006; Tench et al., 2012).
In studying CSiR, a number of studies have demonstrated that it is an important phenomenon
in its own right (Chatterji and Toffel, 2010, Griffin and Mahon, 1997, Lange and Washburn, 2012,
Mattingly and Berman, 2006). Most researchers investigating CSiR follow a net approach by
subtracting it from the total score of CSR (e.g., Wang and Choi 2013); where, for example, a firm
might receive points for employee engagement but lose points for a lack of diversity leading to an
overall CSR score. However, CSR and CSiR are distinct from each other (Chatterji et al., 2009), and
they do not ‘necessarily covary in opposite directions’ (Mattingly and Berman, 2006). For example,
Kotchen and Moon (2012) show that irresponsible behavior has strong positive effects on CSR
adoption, and that firms often perform responsible and irresponsible actions simultaneously.
Likewise, by studying the financial sector during the financial crisis and recession from 2007 to
2010, Herzig and Moon (2013) propose that CSR can precede CSiR, CSiR can exist in the absence
of CSR, or they can exist simultaneously. Accordingly, in this section we provide separate
hypotheses for CSR, CSiR, and for their interactive effects on firm performance.
Although the literature has not reached a definitive consensus on the relationship between
CSR and firm performance, two major literature reviews, one narrative (Margolis and Walsh,
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2003) and one a meta-analysis (Orlitzky et al., 2003), found that the literature tends to suggest a
positive relationship. Numerous studies have empirically demonstrated how benefits can be
obtained including: efficiency improvements, reductions in regulatory costs, new market access,
improved firm reputation, reduced employee turnover, increased customer satisfaction, and the
ability to charge premium prices (Ambec and Lanoie, 2008; Bansal and Bogner, 2002; Bansal
and Clelland, 2004; Dean and Brown, 1995; Faucheux et al., 1998; Galbreath, 2010; Hart, 1995;
Hart and Ahuja, 1996; Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Miles and Covin, 2000; Porter and van der Linde,
1995; Rooney, 1993; Russo and Fouts, 1997). Consistent with this literature, we predict that:
H1: Increasing levels of CSR will be positively related to firm performance
Conversely, the literature has tended to demonstrate that CSiR is related to decreased
firm performance. Costs from CSiR include damaged stakeholder relationships, tainted corporate
reputations (Muller and Kräussl, 2011), increased financial risk (Lioui and Sharma, 2012;
Oikonomou et al., 2012), negative stock market returns (Baron et al., 2011), and increased
severity of market reactions during disasters (Muller and Kräussl, 2011). Consistent with this
literature, we predict that:
H2: Increasing levels of CSiR will be negatively related to firm performance
The next hypothesis represents our main conceptual contribution to the existing CSR
literature as we examine the combination of CSR and CSiR and ask the question: When a firm
exhibits CSR and CSiR simultaneously, what is the relationship to firm performance? To help us
navigate the uncharted waters we theorize angel-halo and devil-horn effects. In particular, an
angel-halo effect exists when previous CSR continues to be rewarded even when the firm
exhibits CSiR. In contrast, a devil-horn effect exists when previous CSiR continues to be
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punished even when the firm exhibits CSR. Clearly the conceptualization of an angel-halo or
devil-horn effect in the simultaneous occurrence of CSR and CSiR are contrasting.
We predict an angel-halo effect (as opposed to a devil-horn effect), where CSR has a
stronger positive effect on firm performance than the negative effect of CSiR. That is, when a
firm increases their CSiR, as long as CSR is present we still expect a positive effect on firm
performance. Further, when a firm increases their CSR, even with CSiR present we still expect a
positive effect on firm performance.
We make this prediction for two reasons: First, for many stakeholders CSiR is often
difficult to identify because of a lack of information or mixed evidence from corporate practices
such as green-washing (Walker and Wan, 2012). In contrast, a firm is likely to advertise and
promote their CSR. Thus corporations may effectively increase stakeholder awareness on their
CSR while hiding or downplaying their CSiR (Walker and Wan, 2012). Similarly, we also
suspect that the level of detail reported by Sustainalytics on CSiR is not common knowledge and
companies may actively seek to hide or confuse the matter. With greater awareness about CSR
than CSiR, we predict a greater effect for CSR on firm performance when CSiR is present.
Second, researchers have noted extensive benefits to firm performance related to CSR
including efficiency improvements, reductions in regulatory costs, new market access, improved
firm reputation, reduced employee turnover, increased customer satisfaction, and the ability to
charge premium prices

(Ambec and Lanoie, 2008; Bansal and Bogner, 2002; Bansal and

Clelland, 2004; Dean and Brown, 1995; Faucheux et al., 1998; Galbreath, 2010; Hart, 1995; Hart
and Ahuja, 1996; Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Miles and Covin, 2000; Porter and van der Linde,
1995; Rooney, 1993; Russo and Fouts, 1997). Conversely, researchers have complied a less
extensive list of the costs of CSiR (Baron et al., 2011; Lioui and Sharma, 2012; Muller and
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Kräussl, 2011; Oikonomou et al., 2012). While this may reflect a research bias in favor or CSR
over CSiR, the numerous potential benefits to CSR seem to outweigh the potential costs to CSiR.
This is not to say that there are not costs to CSiR (indeed see our second hypothesis), only that
when both CSR and CSiR are present the varied benefits to CSR may outweigh the negative
implications of CSiR on firm performance.
Accordingly, if a corporation participates in both CSR and CSiR, we predict an angelhalo effect where the overall effect of firm performance is positive.
H3: If a firm engages in both CSR and CSiR, the impact of CSR dominates leading to a
positive relationship to firm performance.

Data and methods
Data
We compile data from two sources. The first dataset is Sustainalytics, which provides
information for our measures of CSR and CSiR. Sustainalytics is one of the world leading
research companies specializing in Environmental, Social and corporate Governance (ESG) data.
They collect information from primary and secondary sources as well as specialized data
providers.
For any given firm, Sustainalytics provides detailed ratings on up to 148 items. Each item
is assigned a value ranging from 0 and 100 with a higher value representing better performance.
Sustainalytics also provides item weighting based on specific sectors and industries.
Sustainalytics aggregates the weighted score of its individual scores to calculate the total ESG
score. The weighted score addresses common criticisms of other datasets such as KLD, by
acknowledging the differing circumstances in different industries (Surroca et al., 2010).
Therefore, one key benefit of using Sustainalytics is that its weighting scheme give users the
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flexibility to create customized ESG scores based on individual items and corresponding
weights. This benefit allows us to decompose the ESG information into CSR and CSiR.
Although Sustainalytics updates CSR and CSiR values on a monthly basis, Compustat
updates financial information quarterly and annually. Therefore, if changes in CSR and CSiR
have an impact on firm performance, then we would observe the change on a quarterly basis in
Compustat data. We calculated quarterly changes in CSR and CSiR by taking the differences of
CSR and CSiR scores between two consecutive quarters then merged them with the Compustat
data. Following prior literature, we exclude financial companies (SIC code between 6000 and
6999) because financial firms are in a highly regulated industry and they exhibit substantially
different firm-level characteristics compared to non-financial firms. We classify industries based
on the two-digit SIC code and we removed industries with less than 15 observations. Our final
sample contains 11,896 firm-quarter observations during the period of 2009 to 2013.
Variables
Corporate social responsibility and irresponsibility. Our measures of CSR and CSiR were
constructed using rating data in Sustainalytics under five types of stakeholders – Employees
(items S.1.*), Suppliers (S.2.*), Customers (S.3.*), Communities (S.4.*), and Environment (E.*).
The items related to controversies or incidents (including items S.1.7, S.2.3, S.3.3, S.4.3, E.1.12,
E.2.2 and E.3.2) are used to construct the aggregate CSiR variable and the remaining items are
employed to construct the aggregate CSR variable. We compute the CSR and CSiR value as the
sum of the weighted average of the raw scores divided by their weights. This calculation
transforms the CSR and CSiR ratings into a 0-100 scale and it facilitates comparisons across
different industries. To make the interpretation more intuitive, we calculate CSiR as 100 minus
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the weighted adjusted CSiR scores, where 0 represents no CSiR incidents and 100 represents the
worst CSiR incidents. More specially, CSR and CSiR variables are defined as follows:
CSR=

(𝐶𝑆𝑅 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑤 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠∗𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡)
 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡

CSiR=100 -

(𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑅 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑤 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠∗𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡)
 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡

(1)
(2)

We measure the change of CSR and CSiR status as follows: CSR_UP equals to one if the
change in CSR from the previous quarter for any given firm is positive, and zero otherwise;
CSiR_UP equals to 1 if the change in CSiR is positive, and zero otherwise. To test the angel-halo
and devil-horn effects, we generated interaction terms CSR_UP*CSiR and CSiR_UP*CSR to
access the moderating effects.
Firm performance. We use three alternative measures to evaluate firm performance from
different aspects. Two are accounting-based: ROA (net income divided by total assets) and asset
turnover ratio (sales revenue divided by total assets), and one is market-based: Tobin’s q (market
value of equity plus book value of debt, divided by book value of total assets).
Three variables reflect different aspects of firm performance. Specifically: (1) ROA
measures accounting profitability; (2) asset turnover ratio reflects a company’s management
efficiency and whether the firm is using its assets effectively in generating sales; and, (3) Tobin’s
Q is a snapshot of the market value of the firm relative to its book value, where a higher Tobin’s
Q indicates a higher growth opportunity for the firm.
Control variables. Following prior CSR literature we include many common
determinants of firm performance. First, size is measured as the log of total assets. Second, profit
margin is measured as earnings before interest and taxes divided by sales. Third, debt is
measured as long-term debt divided by total assets. Fourth, liquidity is measured as cash divided
by total assets. Fifth, tangibility is measured as net property, plant and equipment divided by
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total assets. Sixth, Research and Development (R&D) is measured as R&D expense divided by
total assets. Lastly, we also include industry and quarterly dummies to control for the fixed
industry and time effects. The industry dummy is coded using the two-digit SIC code while the
quarterly dummy is created by the total quarters during our sample period.
Methodology
We run the following regression model to examine the impact of increase in CSR and
CSiR, as well as their moderating effects on firm performance:
Performancei,t = α + β1Sizei,t-1 + β2Debti,t-1 +β3Liquidityi,t-1 + β4Tangiblei,t-1 + β5RDi,t-1 + β6PMi,t-1
+ β7CSR_UPi,t-1 + β8CSiR_UPi,t-1 + β9CSR_UP*CSiRi,t-1 +β10CSiR_UP*CSRi,t-1 +Quarterly
Dummies+ Industry Dummies+ εi,t
(3)

Where i and t represent firm i at tth quarter, respectively. The dependent variable firm
performance is measured by three variables defined above: ROA, total assets turnover ratio, and
Tobin’s Q. To avoid the impact of outliers biasing the regression results, we winsorize all
variables at the 1% and 99% tails. We also perform a robustness check by running a fixed firm
effects regression and the results remain qualitatively the same.
Results
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables used in
the study. Our data indicates that on average 27.1 of firms increase their CSR, while 20.1 percent
of firms increase their CSiR, relative to the level in the previous quarter. Table 2 presents the
correlations among key variables. We find that the correlations among our control variables are
all less than 35 percent, and thus multicollinearity is not a concern.
-----------------------------------Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here
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------------------------------------Table 3 presents the results for the impact of increases in CSR and CSiR across the three
measures of firm performance. Hypothesis one predicts that increases in CSR will be positively
related to firm performance. Results are consistent with this hypothesis in all three financial
measures. Specifically, increasing CSR is positively and significantly related to ROA, asset
turnover and Tobin’s Q. Hypothesis two predicts that increases in CSiR will be negatively
related to firm performance. We find marginal support for this hypothesis. Although our results
show that CSiR is negatively related to firm performance for all three financial measures, only
the result for ROA are significant.
-----------------------------------Insert Table 3 about here
------------------------------------Next, we test the angle-halo effect. Table 4 presents the results for increasing levels of
CSiR when CSR is present, tested in the interaction term CSiR_UP*CSR. Our regression results
suggest that when CSR is present, increasing CSiR is positively associated with firm
performance in ROA and asset turnover ratio, but not Tobin’s Q. Hypothesis three predicts that
when both CSR and CSiR are present, the impact of CSR will dominate leading to a positive
relationship to firm performance. Overall, our results are consistent with this hypothesis where in
two of three financial measures we find a positive relationship to firm performance.
-----------------------------------Insert Table 4 about here
-------------------------------------
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Table 5 presents the results for increasing levels of CSR when CSiR is present, tested in
the interaction term CSR_UP*CSR. Results suggest that when CSiR is present, increasing CSR
is positively associated with firm performance in asset turnover ratio and Tobin’s Q, but not
ROA. Thus again, overall our results are consistent with hypothesis three where in two of three
financial measures we find a positive relationship to firm performance.
-----------------------------------Insert Table 5 about here
------------------------------------Discussion
We developed and tested three hypotheses in this paper; in this section we discuss each of
them in turn. The first investigated how increases in CSR related to firm performance. Results
were consistent with our hypotheses in all three measures of firm performance. Within our fiveyear (2009-2013) study based on quarterly financial data that occurred immediately after the
Great Recession in 2007-2008, it appeared that increases in CSR were positively related to
higher profitability (ROA), improved efficiency (asset turnover), and improved market valuation
(Tobin’s Q). Such improvements are consistent with past literature (Ambec and Lanoie, 2008;
King and Lenox, 2001; Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky et al., 2003). However, to our
knowledge this is the first study to demonstrate that increasing levels of CSR are related to
profitability, efficiency, and market value. This suggests a dominating role for CSR on firm
performance. Given that our study took place four years after the Great Recession, CSR may
have had a particular influence on firm performance in a highly competitive and constrictive
environment. In addition, our longitudinal study examined a post-recessionary environment
(2009-2010) followed by a period of slow but substantial regrowth (2011-2013). Of interest is
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that regardless of the macro economic cycle, CSR was related to all three measures of firm
performance.
The second hypothesis examined the relationship between changes in CSiR and firm
performance. Results were consistent with the hypothesis for ROA alone, and only marginally
so. Our results suggest that higher CSiR will hurt profitability, and opposite to the positive
impacts of CSR. However, CSiR is not significantly related to management efficiency or market
value. This suggests that CSiR does not represent a poor use of assets nor an inability to generate
sales from these assets, and that the market may not significantly punish CSiR even though it has
a significant negative effect on profitability.
Examining the results for CSR and CSiR together, we found that CSR played a dominant
role on firm performance (positively significant in all three measures of firm performance), while
the influence of CSiR was only marginally significant under ROA (and non-significant for the
other two measures of firm performance). Furthermore, consistent with the predicted angel-halo
effect, when both CSR and CSiR were present regardless of which one was increasing, CSR had
a controlling positive effect. That is, of the six possible relationships (CSR increasing while
CSiR is present and vice versa, for three measures of firm performance), four had a positive
relationship to firm performance. Taking all the results together CSR appears to dominate the
relationship to firm performance as compared to CSiR. In relation to our conceptualization of an
angel-halo or devil-horn effect, clearly we find evidence of an angel-halo effect. That is, firms
tend to benefit financially from their CSR even when CSiR is present, and going even further,
our data demonstrates that the relationship still exists when CSiR is present and increasing.
Two possible reasons for the dominating effect of CSR over CSiR on firm performance
include the ability of firms to emphasize their CSR and downplay, hide, or green-wash their

15
CSiR, and the varied potential benefits to CSR compared to the more limited potential costs of
CSiR. Related to the former, our results suggest that firms can “get away” with CSiR in that it
was not significantly related to measures of management efficiency or market performance.
Further, when exhibiting both CSR and CSiR, the angel-halo enables firm to continue to benefit
in two of three measures of firm performance. Related to the latter, our results showed that CSiR
had only a marginally significant negative effect on ROA, whereas CSR had a significant
positive effect on all three measures of firm performance. This supports the argument that there
are varied benefits to CSR (evidenced in profitability, asset turnover, and Tobin’s Q), and more
limited costs to CSiR (ROA only).

Implications
Theoretical implications
We have two main theoretical implications. First, by examining changing levels of CSR
and CSiR independently and conjunctly, we found a dominating role for CSR. Not only are
increasing levels of CSR related to various measures of firm performance, but it has an
overwhelming positive influence on firm performance in the presence of CSiR. Thus we find
strong support for the existence of an angel-halo effect.
Second, by examining multiple measures of firm performance we found differing effects.
Thus academics must be mindful of which measures of firm performance they use when
examining the relationships between CSR, CSiR and firm performance. Furthermore, perhaps the
best course of action is to always use multiple measures as we try to understand the complexity
of the influence of social behaviors on firm performance. Investigating the relationships of CSR
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and CSiR on various measures of firm performance may also aid in understanding the strategic
implications of corporate social behaviors (Bhattacharyya, 2010; Galbreath, 2009).
Practical implications
We have three main managerial implications. First, our results suggest that managers
should be very specific as to which benefits they seek from their responsible or irresponsible
behavior, and which measures of firm performance to use to gauge CSR or CSiR. For example,
our results suggest the increases in CSiR significantly reduce ROA only, but do not hurt asset
turnover or Tobin’s Q in a pronounced way.
Second, managers would be wise to invest in CSR as our results suggest that they can
improve profitability, efficiency and market value. These are very different and important
financial benefits. Even further, investing in CSR may counter any potential negative effects
from CSiR. Managers may particularly relate to the concept of an angel-halo effect and find
solace in knowing that investments in CSR appear to pay off in multiple ways, and continue to
pay off even when CSiR is present and increasing.
Third, our results tend to suggest that firms can “get away” with some CSiR in two ways.
First, while profits (specifically ROA) may be affected by CSiR, management efficiency (asset
turnover) and market valuation (Tobin’s Q) were unaffected in our study. Second, as long as
CSR is present the angel-halo effect identified in this study allows for some CSiR.
Limitations
Our study has two main limitations both related to the generalizability of our main
finding, the angel-halo effect. First, our results were based on a sample of U.S. firms. Therefore,
to what extent our findings on the angle-halo effect could be generalized to firms in other
countries was beyond the scope of this study and worth future exploration. For example,
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researchers have noted that the consciousness of CSR is less developed in China than in
developed countries, suggesting that we might not find evidence of the angel-halo effect (Yang
& Crowther, 2012). Second, our sample period covers 2009 to 2013, during which the economic
recovery was slow and weak, and was venerably impacted by several macro shocks, such as the
U.S. sovereign debt rating downgrades by S&P in August 2011, and the European sovereign debt
crisis in 2011-2012. Whether the angel-halo effect observed in our paper persists in a normal
economic environment is an important question to pursue in future research.
Conclusion
In this study we found that increasing levels of CSR are related to improved profitability,
efficiency and market value, and that increasing levels of CSiR are marginally related to
decreased profitability. Our research question asked how do increases in CSR (CSiR) while
CSiR (CSR) is present relate to various measures of firm performance? We found that increasing
levels of CSR when CSiR is present are related to improved efficiency and market value, and
that increasing levels of CSiR when CSR is present are related to improved profitability and
efficiency.
Our results are clear in demonstrating (1) varied benefits to firm performance from CSR;
and, (2) an angel-halo effect, where CSR “outweighs” CSiR. In a world of paradoxes, the results
from this study suggest that CSR is rewarded, even when it exists simultaneously with CSiR.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Size
ROA
Q
Turnover
Debt
Liquidity
Tangible
PM
RD
CSR_UP
CSiR_UP
CSR
CSiR

Mean
8.819
0.015
1.391
0.232
0.237
0.876
0.302
0.035
0.006
0.271
0.201
22.749
4.326

SD
1.208
0.033
1.321
0.178
0.183
18.291
0.244
7.907
0.013
0.445
0.401
15.015
8.248

Median
8.712
0.015
1.023
0.184
0.220
0.381
0.219
0.135
0.000
0.000
0.000
18.977
5.751

N
11173
11168
11039
11170
11096
11155
11143
11142
11190
10432
10432
11190
11190
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix
ROA Turnover
ROA
1
Turnover
0.1478*
1
Q
0.2687*
0.1482*
Size
-0.0262* -0.1273*
Debt
-0.1710* -0.1803*
Liquidity
-0.1174* -0.0307*
Tangible
-0.1114* -0.1738*
RD
-0.0328* -0.1204*
PM
0.1277*
0.0138
CSR_UP
0.0217*
-0.0054
CSiR_UP
0.0025
0.0019
*denotes 10% significance

Q

Size

Debt

Liquidity

Tangible

RD

PM

CSR_UP

CSiR_U
P

1
-0.3794*
-0.2932*
0.2473*
-0.2324*
0.3294*
-0.1630*
0.0097
0.0073

1
0.1452*
-0.0514*
0.2040*
-0.2135*
0.0394*
0.0919*
0.0362*

1
-0.0207*
0.2736*
-0.2433*
0.0118
-0.0384*
0.0111

1
-0.0264*
0.1916*
-0.9249*
0.0225*
0.0268*

1
-0.3114*
0.0133
0.002
0.0258*

1
-0.1707*
0.0197*
-0.0154

1
-0.0181*
-0.0225*

1
0.2971*

1

23
Table 3: Regression Results for Increasing Levels of CSR and CSiR

Dependent variables:
ROA
CSR_UP
CSiR_UP
Size

0.001

0.008

0.065

(2.67)***

(2.95)***

-0.001

-0.004

-0.042

(1.76)*

(1.08)

(1.28)

-0.001
-0.026
(18.56)***

Liquidity

-0.005
(14.10)***

Tangible
RD

-0.018
(17.33)***

-0.101
(13.19)***

-0.066
(32.02)***

-1.332
(22.40)***

0.102
(6.37)***

-0.049

-0.087

(3.80)***

(5.76)***

(1.31)

-0.082

-0.776

20.682

(3.69)***

(6.48)***

(22.23)***

-0.154
(16.68)***

Adjusted R2
N

-0.320
(39.78)***

-0.006

PM
Constant

Q

(2.00)**

(6.57)***

Debt

Turnover

2.646
(36.72)***

0.046

0.466

3.918

(14.51)***

(26.73)***

(28.20)***

0.16
10,283

0.62
10,263

0.48
10,155

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 4: Regression Results for Increasing Levels of CSiR when CSR is Present
Dependent variables:
CSiR_UP

ROA
-0.003
(3.22)***

CSiR_UP*CSR
Size

0.001

0.001

(3.58)***

(1.02)

-0.001
-0.026
-0.005
(14.04)***

Tangible
RD

-0.019
(17.52)***

-0.101
(13.17)***

-0.066
(31.95)***

-1.335
(22.45)***

0.103
(6.41)***

-0.049

-0.089

(3.88)***

(5.84)***

(1.34)

-0.084

-0.784

20.704

(3.76)***

(6.54)***

(22.24)***

-0.154
(16.68)***

Adjusted R2
N

-0.320
(38.63)***

-0.006

PM
Constant

(1.21)

0.000

(18.53)***

Liquidity

(2.80)***

Q
-0.052

(3.28)***
(7.04)***

Debt

Turnover
-0.015

2.647
(36.72)***

0.048

0.474

3.956

(14.93)***

(27.20)***

(28.45)***

0.16
10,283

0.62
10,263

0.48
10,155

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 5: Regression Results for Increasing Levels of CSR when CSiR is Present
Dependent variables:
CSR_UP
CSR_UP*CSiR
Size

ROA
0.001

Turnover
0.005

(1.28)

(1.57)

0.000

0.000

0.006

(2.07)**

(3.27)***

-0.001
-0.026
(18.50)***

Liquidity

-0.005
(14.10)***

Tangible
RD

-0.018
(17.25)***

-0.100
(13.08)***

-0.066
(32.01)***

-1.322
(22.22)***

0.103
(6.39)***

-0.049

-0.091

(3.83)***

(5.80)***

(1.37)

-0.081

-0.773

20.717

(3.67)***

(6.45)***

(22.28)***

-0.154
(16.62)***

Adjusted R2
N

-0.326
(39.26)***

-0.006

PM
Constant

(1.36)

(0.77)
(6.49)***

Debt

Q
0.031

2.653
(36.83)***

0.045

0.461

3.868

(14.54)***

(27.37)***

(28.76)***

0.16
10,283

0.62
10,263

0.48
10,155

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

